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Abstract 
The South China Sea ranks among the most geographically and geopolitically complex ocean spaces in 
the world. It certainly appears to have been one of its most vigorously contested, featuring multiple, 
longstanding and competing territorial and maritime jurisdictional claims. The objective of this chapter is 
to provide the geographical and geopolitical background to the frequently conflicting national maritime 
claims made by the South China Sea littoral States. This exercise is designed to provide the necessary 
contextual backdrop to considerations of the application of maritime joint development mechanisms 
and/or other provisional arrangements of a practical nature in the South China Sea. 
With this in mind, key characteristics of the coastal geography of the South China Sea are outlined, 
notably the implications of its semienclosed nature and the baselines that have been defined along its 
coasts. The insular features of the South China Sea, many of which are subject to conflicting sovereignty 
claims, are then examined with particular reference to their potential maritime claims and role in the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries. The chapter then outlines the maritime jurisdictional claims of the 
South China Sea coastal States, including existing maritime boundary agreements and maritime joint 
development zones, as well as unilateral and historical maritime claims. 
Accordingly, a spatial picture of the maritime geography of the South China Sea including the locations 
and extents of claims to maritime jurisdiction is built up. The chapter then proceeds to highlight the main 
geopolitical factors that arguably serve as key drivers for the South China Sea disputes. These include 
longstanding yet still powerful sovereignty imperatives, significant and growing marine resource interests 
and energy security concerns, crucial navigational and maritime trade considerations and evolving 
military and strategic factors. 
Keywords 
stake, south, considerations, geopolitical, china, geographical, sea 
Disciplines 
Arts and Humanities | Law 
Publication Details 
Schofield, C. (2013). What's at stake in the South China Sea? Geographical and geopolitical 
considerations. In R. Beckman, I. Townsend-Gault, C. Schofield, T. Davenport and L. Bernard (Eds.), 
Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal Frameworks for the Joint Development of 
Hydrocarbon Resources (pp. 11-46). United Kingdom: Edward Elgar. 




WHAT’S AT STAKE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA? 





The South China Sea ranks among the most geographically and geopolitically complex ocean 
spaces in the world. It certainly appears to have been one of its most vigorously contested, 
featuring multiple, longstanding and competing territorial and maritime jurisdictional claims. 
The objective of this paper is to provide the geographical and geopolitical background to the 
frequently conflicting national maritime claims made by the South China Sea littoral States. 
This exercise is designed to provide the necessary contextual backdrop to considerations of 
the application of maritime joint development mechanisms and/or other provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature in the South China Sea. 
 
With this in mind, key characteristics of the coastal geography of the South China Sea 
are outlined, notably the implications of its semi-enclosed nature and the baselines that have 
been defined along its coasts. The insular features of the South China Sea, many of which are 
subject to conflicting sovereignty claims, are then examined with particular reference to their 
potential maritime claims and role in the delimitation of maritime boundaries. The paper then 
outlines the maritime jurisdictional claims of the South China Sea coastal States, including 
existing maritime boundary agreements and maritime joint development zones, as well as 




Accordingly, a spatial picture of the maritime geography of the South China Sea 
including the locations and extents of claims to maritime jurisdiction is built up. The paper 
then proceeds to highlight the main geopolitical factors that arguably serve as key drivers for 
the South China Sea disputes. These include longstanding yet still powerful sovereignty 
imperatives, significant and growing marine resource interests and energy security concerns, 
crucial navigational and maritime trade considerations and evolving military and strategic 
factors. 
 
II. Geographical Considerations and Claims to Maritime Space 
 
A. Geographical context 
 
The South China Sea is a large ocean space located between the southern coast of China and 
Taiwan to the north, the mainland and peninsular coasts of Southeast Asia to the west and the 
archipelagic island groups of the Philippines, Borneo and Indonesia to the east and south. 
This semi-enclosed sea is bordered by the six claimants to the disputed South China Sea 
islands (Brunei Darussalam (Brunei), the People’s Republic of China (China), Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, and Viet Nam) and two non-claimants (Indonesia and Singapore). 





The limits of the South China Sea have been defined as extending southwards from 
the Strait of Taiwan to around the 3° South parallel of latitude.
1
 It has, however, been 
suggested that the 1° North parallel of latitude may be a more appropriate southern limit.
2
 If 
the latter definition is taken, the total surface area of the South China Sea (including the Gulf 
of Thailand) has been calculated at approximately three million square kilometres (equivalent 
to around 874,660 square nautical miles (nm)).
3
 The coastal geography of the South China 
Sea is both characterized and complicated by the presence of a profusion of predominantly 
small islands, islets, rocks and reefs. These coastal fronts are directly related to the maritime 
claims of the claimants. 
 
B. Baseline Claims 
 
National claims to maritime jurisdiction are fundamentally dependent on, first, possession of 
land territory with a coast and, second, the geography of the coast concerned. Indeed, it has 
been observed: ‘...the land dominates the sea and it dominates it by the intermediary of the 
coastal front’.
4
 More precisely, a coastal State’s maritime claims are measured from baselines 
                                                 
1
 According to the International Hydrographic Organization, the southernmost defining point of the South China 
Sea is Lucipara Point on the east coast of Sumatra. See, International Hydrographic Organization, Limits of 
Oceans and Seas, Special Publication No 23, 3rd ed. (Monte Carlo: IHO, 1953), at 30. 
2
 Hasjim Djalal, ‘South China Sea Island Disputes,’ in MH Nordquist and JN Moore, eds, Security Flashpoints: 
Oil, Islands, Sea Access and Military Confrontation (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998), 109–133, 
at 109. 
3
 Ibid. Technically the correct abbreviation for a nautical mile is ‘M’, while ‘nm’ denotes nanometres. However, 
‘nm’ is widely used by many authorities (for example the UN Office of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea) 
and appears to cause less confusion than ‘M’, which is often assumed to be an abbreviation for metres. 
4
 Prosper Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation - Reflections, (Cambridge: Grotius, 1989), at 50. 
18 
 
defined along its coasts. In the absence of any other claim, ‘normal’ baselines will be used 
coincident with the low-water line along the coast. However, relevant international law as 
represented by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
5
 provides 
for several types of straight line baselines to be drawn as an alternative to normal baselines. It 
is worth noting at this point that UNCLOS provides the fundamental legal framework 
governing maritime jurisdictional claims, which has gained widespread acceptance by the 




Several of the South China Sea claimants have taken the view that their coastlines are 
complex enough to justify the application of straight baselines along large parts of their 
coastal fronts. Article 7 of UNCLOS allows coastal States to depart from normal, low-water 
line, baselines along selected parts of their coastlines. The intention of Article 7 is, 
essentially, to deal with particularly complex coastal geography where the configuration of 
the coastline is such that using ‘highly irregular’
7
 normal baselines would result in similarly 
                                                 
5
 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Publication No E97.V10, (United Nations, 
New York, 1983). See 1833 UNTS 3, opened for signature 10 December 1982, Montego Bay, Jamaica (entered 
into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS or the Convention], online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm>. 
6
 At the time of writing there were 164 parties to UNCLOS, comprising 163 States plus the European 
Community. See United Nations, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the 
Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the 
implementation of the Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks, New York, updated on 29 November 2012, online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf >. 
7
 See International Hydrographic Organization (with the International Oceanographic Commission and the 
International Association of Geodesy), A Manual on Technical Aspects of the United Nations Convention on the 
19 
 
irregular maritime limits, such as a complex mosaic of enclaves or pockets of non-territorial 
sea areas within a State’s territorial sea.
8
 In accordance with Article 7 of UNCLOS straight 
baselines may be drawn ‘where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a 
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.’ Rather than apply straight 
baselines to selected parts of their coastlines, however, both China and Viet Nam have opted 
to front the vast majority of their mainland coastlines with systems of straight baselines.  
 
This liberal interpretation of the admittedly rather loosely phrased terms of Article 7 
of UNCLOS runs counter to the view of the International Court of Justice, as expressed in its 
decision in the Qatar/Bahrain Case, where it stated unequivocally that the method of straight 
baselines in accordance with UNCLOS ‘must be applied restrictively.’
9
 It is highly 
questionable whether the coastlines in question are sufficiently deeply indented, cut into, or 
feature a suitable fringe of islands sufficiently close to the coast to justify their being fronted 
by a system of straight baselines. Further, the Western terminus of the system in the Gulf of 
Thailand is at ‘Point O’, out to sea and joining the Cambodian baseline system (see below). 
Accordingly, these extensive claimed systems of straight baselines have been viewed as 
                                                                                                                                                        
Law of the Sea, 1982, Special Publication no 51, 4th ed, (Monaco: International Hydrographic Bureau, 2006), 
Chapter 4, at 6. 
8
 United Nations, Baselines: An Examination of the Relevant Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, (New York: Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, 1989). 
9
 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, Judgment (2001) ICJ 









Viet Nam made a claim to straight baselines in 1977,
11
 with the claim being 
implemented in 1982.
12
 Viet Nam’s claimed straight baselines start in the north and extend 
for a distance of approximately 850 nm to enclose the entire Vietnamese coast south of the 
Gulf of Tonkin.
13
 The islands used as basepoints for Viet Nam’s claimed straight baselines 
are small, scattered and largely distant from the mainland coast, such that of the nine turning 
points defined five are more than 50 nm offshore. Viet Nam’s straight baselines claims have, 
consequently, been subject to critical appraisal by the US Department of State
14
 and have 
been subject to US
15
 and Thai protests.
16
 
                                                 
10
 See generally, J Ashley Roach and Robert Smith, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996). 
11
 The straight baselines were claimed through Viet Nam’s Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous 
Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of 12 May 1977, online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/VNM_1977_Statement.pdf>. 
12
 Declaration on Baseline of Territorial Waters of 12 November 1982, online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/VNM_1982_Statement.pdf>. 
13
 US Department of State, ‘Straight Baselines: Viet Nam’, Limits in the Sea, No 99, (Washington DC: Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research, 12 December 1983), at 5. 
14
 Ibid. In particular the US analysis highlighted that the longest distance between basepoints is 161.8 nm, (the 
average being 84.6 nm), that island basepoints averaged 39.4nm offshore with a maximum of 80.7 nm offshore 






 The US protest note stated that ‘there is no basis in international law for the system of straight baselines 
provided in the declaration of November 12, 1982’, see Roach and Smith, supra note 10, at 102. 
16
 The Thai protest note, dated 9 December 1985, stated that between points 0 and A7, Viet Nam’s claimed 
straight baselines were ‘at variance with the well-established rules of international law’, referring to both the 




China enacted enabling legislation on baselines in 1992
17
 and partially defined the 
baselines in 1996.
18
 The 1996 claim defines straight baselines along the majority of its 
mainland coast. A detailed analysis of this baseline system was undertaken by the US 
Department of State. The analysis was highly critical of China’s baseline claim on the basis 
that China’s coastline does not meet the criteria laid out in Article 7 of UNCLOS for the 
application of straight baselines.
19
 It is worth noting with respect to China’s straight baselines 
claims that this designation is only partial. While China defined straight baselines around the 
Paracel Islands
20
 (a feature of the Chinese claim that has also been the subject to criticism),
21
 
no straight baselines were defined around the disputed Spratly Islands, though such baselines 
could be designated in the future. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
international law in relation to the sea areas in question and the airspace above them’; see UN Law of the Sea 
Bulletin 7 (April 1986), at 111. 
17
 See Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 25 February 1992, online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf>. 
18
 See Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the baselines of the territorial sea, 
15 May 1996, online United Nations: 
>http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1996_Declaration.pdf >. 
19
 See US Department of State, ‘Straight Baseline Claim: China,’ Limits in the Seas, No 117 (Washington, DC: 
Office of Ocean Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US 
Department of State, 9 July 1996), online: US Department of State 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/57692.pdf >. 
20
 Chen Degong, ‘China and the Law of the Sea’, Occasional Paper, Canberra, Northeast Asia Program, 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, December 1996, at 23. 
21
 US Department of State, supra note 19, at 8. 
22 
 
For its part Taiwan has defined its own system of straight baselines. This system of 
straight baselines is extensive and applies not only to Taiwan’s main islands but also to Pratas 
Island and the Macclesfield Bank. While at first glance Taiwan’s baselines claim gives the 
appearance of archipelagic baselines, they are, in fact, straight baselines, taking into account 
Taiwan’s claim to represent China as a whole. Taiwan’s claimed straight baselines, defined 




Malaysia has not publicised the location of its claimed straight baselines. Their 
existence can be inferred from an examination of official maps, notably the 1979 map (often 
referred to as the ‘Malaysian Map’) issued by the Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping 
on 21 December 1979 in order to illustrate Malaysia’s agreed maritime boundaries and the 
limits of Malaysia’s unilateral territorial sea and continental shelf claims.
23
 Although no 
baselines are shown on these maps, the fact that in certain areas the outer limit of the 
Malaysian territorial sea claim is marked with straight lines leads to the conclusion that 
Malaysia has necessarily constructed a system of straight baselines. Malaysia subsequently 
enacted legislation in 2006 that provides for the declaration of the coordinates of the 
                                                 
22
 A comprehensive and critical analysis of this claim is provided by the US Department of State; see: US 
Department of State, ‘Taiwan’s Maritime Claims,’ Limits in the Seas, No. 127, (Washington DC: Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, 15 November 2005). 
23
 The Peta Menunjukkan Sempadan Perairan dan Pelantar Benua Malaysia or ‘Map Showing the Territorial 
Waters and Continental Shelf Boundaries of Malaysia,’ often referred to as the Peta Baru [New Map], published 
by the Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping in two sheets. The location of these baselines may then be 
determined by drawing lines parallel to the outer limit of the Malaysian territorial sea claim but 12 nm landward 
of the straight line limits of the Malaysian territorial sea claim. See Clive Schofield and May Tan-Mullins, 
‘Claims, Conflicts and Cooperation in the Gulf of Thailand’ (2008) 22 Ocean YB 75, at 86-87; and Mark J 
Valencia, ‘Validity of Malaysia’s baselines and territorial sea claim in the northern Malacca Strait’, (2003) 27 
Marine Policy 367, at 367-373. 
23 
 
basepoints for defining its baselines, though such coordinates have yet to be defined, or at 
least published.
24
 Further, the joint submission of Malaysia and Viet Nam with respect to 
extended continental shelf rights revealed the location of some of Malaysia’s straight 
baselines, specifically those fronting the coast of the Malaysian provinces of Sarawak and 





The straight baseline claims of Cambodia and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Thailand 
in the Gulf of Thailand are also questionable. Cambodia’s present straight baselines, claimed 
in 1982,
26
 join up with those of Viet Nam at a ‘floating’ point and join up small and disparate 
islets. While Thailand’s 1970-vintage straight baselines in the Gulf of Thailand were 
                                                 
24
 Vivian L Forbes, ‘The Territorial Sea Datum of Malaysia’, (2007) 14:4 MIMA Bulletin 3, at 7-8. 
25
 Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 
8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 in respect of the southern part of the South 
China Sea, Executive Summary, 6 May 2009, online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm>. 
26
 Cambodia’s claim was made through a Council of State Decree dated 13 July 1982. In this legislation 
Cambodia’s baselines were defined as being ‘straight baselines, linking the points of the coast and the furthest 






 its 1992 designation of additional area (Area 4) of straight baselines 
was considerably less so,
28




The South China Sea is also host to two archipelagic States: Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Both have defined archipelagic baselines which are compliant with Article 47 of 
UNCLOS. Indonesia claimed archipelagic baselines from 1960 and has revised and refined 
its claims on several occasions since, notably through legislation in 1996 and regulations in 
2002 and 2008.
30
 Indonesia subsequently deposited documents detailing the location of its 
archipelagic baselines, including the coordinates of and a map illustrating the 195 turning 
points involved, with the United Nations Secretary-General on 11 March 2009.
31
 These 
archipelagic baselines encompass the outermost rocks and reefs of the Natuna Islands group 
in the southwest of the South China Sea. 
                                                 
27
 Areas 1 and 2 of Thailand’s straight baselines claim lie in the Gulf of Thailand. The other area (Area 3) is 
located on Thailand’s western coast on the Andaman Sea. The announcement of the Prime Minister’s Office 
concerning straight baselines and internal waters of Thailand was published in the Official Gazette, Special 
Volume 87, Chapter 52, 12 June 1970, online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/THA_1970_Announcement.pdf>. 
28
 United Nations, UN Law of the Sea Bulletin 25 (June 1994), at 82–84, online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/THA_1992_Announcement.pdf>. 
29
 For example, the US Department of State analysis of this extension to Thailand’s claimed straight baselines 
stated categorically that ‘clearly this is an excessive maritime claim.’ See US Department of State, Straight 
Baseline Claim: Thailand, Limits in the Seas, No 122 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 8 September 2000), at 9. 
30
 See Clive Schofield and Andi Arsana, ‘Closing the Loop: Indonesia’s Revised Archipelagic Baselines 
System’, Commentary, (2009) 1 Aus J Mar & Ocean Aff 2, at 57-62. 
31





For a considerable period the Philippines claim to baselines was at variance with the 
terms of UNCLOS. The baselines claimed by the Philippines in 1961 and revised in 1968 not 
only included a baselines segment (141 nm long) in excess of the maximum length permitted 
under Article 47(2) of UNCLOS (125 nm), but were framed as straight baselines with 
internal rather than archipelagic waters claimed within them. In 2009, however, the 
Philippines revised its baselines and brought them into line with UNCLOS.
32
 The Philippines 
now claims archipelagic baselines around its main archipelago and applies the ‘regime of 
islands’ to outlying islands claimed, such as Scarborough Reef (or Shoal) and those Spratly 
Islands claimed by the Philippines as part of its Kalyaan Island Group (KIG) claim. The 
inclusion of the disputed South China Sea islands in the Philippines legislation and 
reconfirmation of the Philippines sovereignty claims to these features led to protests from 
China on the grounds that this represented a violation of Chinese sovereignty.
33
 Further, the 
maritime claims of the Philippines remain problematic on account of its historically-inspired 
claim to the Philippines Treaty Limits (see below). 
 
C. A ‘labyrinth of detached shoals’: The islands of the South China Sea 
 
As noted, a key feature of the maritime geography of the South China Sea is the presence of 
myriad predominantly small islands, islets, rocks, cays, shoals and drying reefs. The main 
island groups of the South China Sea are as follows:  
 
                                                 
32
 Republic Act No 9522, 10 March 2009. 
33




1. The Paracel Islands, located to the northeast which comprise around 130 islands, 
predominantly divided between the Crescent and Amphritite groups which are 




2. The Pratas Islands, located to the northeast of the South China Sea and comprising 




3. Scarborough Reef, to the northeast, which has been described as ‘step-to on all sides 
and consists of a narrow belt of coral’, which is predominantly submerged at high tide 
but surmounted by a ‘tallest rock’ 3m high. This feature is disputed between China 
and the Philippines.
36
 A feature often associated with Scarborough Reef, especially by 
China, is Macclesfield Bank. This is an entirely submerged feature described as a 




4. The Natuna Islands, located in the southwest of the South China Sea are an extensive 




                                                 
34
 See United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO), China Sea Pilot, Vol 1, 8
th
 ed, Admiralty Sailing 
Directions, (Taunton: UKHO, 2010), at 75-78. 
35
 Ibid, at 78. 
36
 See United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, China Sea Pilot, Vol 2, 9
th
 ed, Admiralty Sailing Directions, 
(Taunton: UKHO, 2010), at 74. 
37
 See UKHO, China Sea Pilot, Vol 1, supra note 34, at 68-69. 
38
 Comprising an extensive group of islands in the southwestern South China Sea. See UKHO, China Sea Pilot, 




5. The Spratly Islands (see below).  
 
With respect to the Spratly Islands, one notable early description of this complex and 
numerous group of insular features dating from 1889 aptly refers to a ‘labyrinth of detached 
shoals’.
39
 It can further be observed that traditionally the islands of the South China Sea have 
generally been ignored. Predominantly consisting of very small, uninhabited islets of little 
apparent intrinsic worth, they have long been regarded as little more than hazards to 
navigation. For example, British Admiralty navigational charts routinely marked (and still 
mark) the area occupied by the Spratly Islands, appropriately enough, as ‘Dangerous 
Ground’.
40
 Arguably it is only since the expansion of national maritime claims offshore and 
growing awareness of the valuable marine resources that may be contained within these 
maritime spaces that disputes have surfaced. 
 
It is generally well known the sovereignty disputes over islands in the South China 
Sea relate to the Paracel Islands group in the northwest (disputed between China and Viet 
Nam), the Scarborough Reef (or Shoal) in the northeast (between China and the Philippines), 
and the Spratly Islands group (claimed in whole or in part by Brunei, China/Taiwan, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Viet Nam).
41
 What is often less well understood is the 
                                                 
39
 AG Findlay, Indian Archipelago and China Directory, 3
rd
 ed. (Richard Holmes Laurie: London, 1889), at vi, 
quoted in David Hancox and JR Victor Prescott, Secret Hydrographic Surveys in the Spratly Islands, (The 
Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: 1997), at 1.  
40
 Clive Schofield, ‘Dangerous Ground – A geopolitical overview of the South China Sea’ in S Bateman and R 
Emmers, eds, The South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime, (Routledge: London, 2009), 
at 7-25.  
41
 The littoral States give one or both of these island groups names in their respective vernaculars: for the sake 
of consistency and clarity English language toponyms will be used. 
28 
 
geographical characteristics of these island groups. For example there exists great 
uncertainty, on the part of media commentators and also in academic literature, as to the 
answer to the deceptively simple-sounding question: ‘how many Spratly Islands are there?’ 
On the face of it this seems surprising, given the concerted focus on disputes involving these 
islands, and on the South China Sea area, over a considerable period of time. 
 
A key source of uncertainty relates to the lack of clarity over what type of insular 
feature is under discussion. ‘Islands’ of the South China Sea range from relatively large 
features, with their own water sources and vegetation which have been developed, for 
example, to host military garrisons and runways, to much smaller islets, rocks, low-tide 
elevations and reefs as well as entirely sub-surface features on which structures may have 
been built. These features are scattered over a considerable area of ocean – estimated to be of 




 An additional source of confusion in this context is the fact that 
many of the features in question boast multiple names in a variety of languages.
43
 This 
complexity of insular features, coupled with uncertainties as to what to count and even how 
to refer to features, has led different commentators to arrive at radically different figures with 
respect to, for example, the number of ‘islands’ that make up the Spratly Islands. At one end 
of the spectrum it has been suggested that there are as many as 400
44
 or even 500 islands in 
                                                 
42
 See Daniel J Dzurek, The Spratly Islands: Who’s On First?, (International Boundaries Research Unit: 
Durham, 1996), at 1. 
43
 See Schofield, supra note 40, at 9-10. 
44
 See Craig Snyder, ‘The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventative Diplomacy’, USIP Special 




the Spratly Islands group.
45
 Other commentators suggest figures in the range of 150-180. For 





With respect to types of insular feature, UNCLOS provides for several options. In 
brief these include islands and rocks, low-tide elevations, reefs and artificial islands. The 
Regime of Islands is provided for in a single article of UNCLOS, this being Article 121 
which covers both islands and a sub-category of island termed ‘rocks’. The provisions of 
Article 121 have excited considerable debate over the years.
47
 Article 121(1) of UNCLOS is 
relatively uncontroversial, defining an island as ‘a naturally formed area of land, surrounded 
by water, which is above water at high tide’, as is the subsequent paragraph of the Article 
which states that the maritime claims made from islands should be determined in the same 
manner as for ‘other land territory’. However, UNCLOS Article 121(3) provides for a sub-
                                                 
45
 See for example, Glen Hearns and Peter Tyedmers, ‘Poseidon’s Trident: biological Diversity Preservation, 
Resource Conservation and Conflict Avoidance in the South China Sea’, in Gerald H Blake, et al, eds, The 
Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources, (Graham and Trotman: London, 1995), at 290. 
46
 See Dzurek, supra note 42, at 1. 
47
 See for example, Jonathan I Charney, ‘Rocks that cannot sustain human habitation’, (1999) 93 AJIL 4, at 863-
78; Alexander GO Elferink, ‘Clarifying Article 121 (3) of the Law of the Sea Convention: the limits set by the 
nature of international legal processes’, (1998) 6 Boundary & Security Bulletin 2, at 58-68; Barbara 
Kwaitkowska and Alfred HA Soons, ‘Entitlement to maritime areas of rocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own’, (1990) Netherlands YB of Int’l L XXI, at 139-81; JR Victor Prescott 
and Clive H Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2005), at 61-75; Jon M Van Dyke and RA Brooks, ‘Uninhabited islands: their impact on the 
ownership of the oceans’ resources’, (1983) Ocean Devel & Int’l L 12, at 265-84; and Jon M Van Dyke, J 
Morgan and J Gurish, ‘The exclusive economic zone of the northwestern Hawaiian Islands: when do 
uninhabited islands generate an EEZ?’, (1988) 25 San Diego L Rev 3, at 425-494. 
30 
 
category of islands, ‘rocks’, that are incapable of supporting human habitation or an 
economic life of their own. Such features ‘shall have no exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf’ – an enormous disadvantage in terms of capacity to generate claims to 
maritime jurisdiction. Going to theoretical extremes, if an island had no maritime neighbours 
within 400 nm, it could generate 125,664
2
 nm (431,014 km
2
) of territorial sea, exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf rights as compared to the capacity of a ‘rock’ to 








To date, however, no reliable way of distinguishing between these types of insular 
feature has emerged, despite the fact that to do so is critical for determining their capacity to 
generate claims to maritime jurisdiction. In short, despite exhaustive analysis, for instance of 
the drafting history of Article 121 of UNCLOS, together with detailed analysis of past State 
practice and the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, Article 121 remains a 
conundrum and open to considerably varied interpretations. 
 
Many of the features making up the disputed South China Sea islands, especially low-
lying reef-type features, can be categorised as low-tide elevations, defined in Article 13 of 
UNCLOS as a ‘naturally-formed area of land which is surrounded by water at low-tide but 
submerged at high-tide.’ Such features are considered to be distinct from islands as a result of 
their being in an inundated state at high tide. Consequently, low tide elevations are not 
capable of generating claims to maritime space in their own right. Instead, they may be used 
as territorial sea basepoints, but only if the low-tide elevation in question falls wholly or 
partially within the breadth of the territorial sea measured from the normal baseline of a 
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State’s mainland or island coasts.
49
 A low-tide elevation’s value for maritime jurisdictional 
claims is, therefore, geographically restricted to coastal locations. Such features have been 
termed ‘parasitic basepoints’ as their zone-generative capacity is reliant on their proximity to 




As far as features such as banks and shoals that are never above low water are 
concerned, such features have no capacity to generate claims to maritime jurisdiction under 
UNCLOS. It should also be noted that despite submerged reef platforms having been used to 
build artificial structures, UNCLOS Article 60(8) states unambiguously that: ‘Artificial 
islands, installation and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no 
territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial 




Overall it would seem that the vast majority of features making up the disputed 
‘islands’ of the South China Sea and the Spratly ‘Islands’ in particular are not islands capable 
of generating extended claims to maritime jurisdiction in accordance with the first two 
paragraphs of Article 121 of UNCLOS. Indeed, it has been suggested that only 48 features 
among the Spratly Islands group are known to rise above high-tide and thus be subject to the 
regime of islands.
52
 While some of these above high-tide features among the Spratlys are 
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relatively substantial features – the largest, Itu Aba being 1.4km long and 370m wide with an 
area of approximately 50 hectares – and may conceivably be considered as ‘full’ islands from 
which EEZ and continental shelf rights could be advanced, it would seem likely that many of 
the other features that make up the disputed islands of the South China Sea, even if above 
water at high-tide, could well be reasonably classified as mere ‘rocks’ within the meaning of 
Article 121(3). It is also worth observing that none of the disputed islands boasts an 
indigenous population or longstanding history of habitation, only what are essentially 
garrisons of government personnel, and this can be regarded as a pertinent factor when 
considering the question of whether a feature is capable of sustaining ‘human habitation’ in 
accordance with UNCLOS Article 121(3). Accordingly, the vast majority of the disputed 
features generally termed Spratly ‘Islands’ are no more than low-tide elevations, or even 
submerged features with limited or no capacity to generate claims to maritime jurisdiction. 
 
If features among the Spratly Islands are categorised as mere ‘rocks’ consistent with 
the terms of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, and thus deemed incapable of supporting human 
habitation or an economic life of their own, their capacity to generate claims to maritime 
jurisdiction would be severely restricted. The debate over whether features are ‘full’ islands 
versus mere ‘rocks’ is, however, arguably something of a distraction. The disputed features, 
even the largest among them, are clearly small and have short coastal fronts. The lengths of 
the coastal fronts involved, and in particular the existence of a significant disparity in the 
lengths of relevant coasts, has proved to be an influential factor in maritime boundary 
delimitations in the past.
53
 Further, a review of the treatment of islands in the delimitation of 
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maritime boundaries suggests that such features would consequently have a significantly 
reduced influence on the course of any maritime boundary defined between, for example, the 
disputed islands and the surrounding mainland or main island coasts. Such a conclusion has 
been reinforced by recent rulings on the part of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries where islands have been a key consideration. In both the Black Sea Case before 
the ICJ of 2009 and Bay of Bengal Case before ITLOS which concluded in 2012, islands 





This, in turn, suggests that the potential maritime claims to be made from the disputed 
islands of the South China Sea, often illustrated by reference to maps giving these features 
full-effect in the generation of strict equidistance lines, is misleading. For example, an 
equidistance line constructed around the Spratly Islands and according them full-effect 




 However, debates over island status 
and the capacity of insular features to generate claims to maritime space, let alone their 
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potential role in the delimitation of maritime boundaries, tend to be obscured by the claims to 
sovereignty over the territory of the islands themselves. Such sovereignty claims also 
manifest themselves in a physical sense as illustrated by the fact that all of the claimants with 
the exception of Brunei, have sought to back up their territorial and maritime claims by 
occupying features among the disputed South China Sea islands. The resolution of these 
island sovereignty disputes can be regarded as an essential precursor to the settlement of 
overlapping maritime claims and the delimitation of maritime boundaries. Nonetheless, as 
subsequent chapters in this volume demonstrate, even highly complex and contentious 
disputes can be side-stepped through the application of maritime joint development 
arrangements and, further, this can be achieved in a manner that does not undermine the 
parties existing sovereignty and jurisdictional claims. 
 
D. Converging claims to maritime jurisdiction 
 
As previously noted, UNCLOS provides the generally accepted international legal framework 
governing maritime jurisdiction. Among the States bordering the South China Sea, Brunei, 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Viet Nam have all signed and 
ratified the UNCLOS. Of the Gulf of Thailand States, Cambodia has signed the Convention 
but has yet to ratify it. For its part Thailand signed the Convention in 1982 but only finally 
acceded to it in May 2011.
56
 Additionally, non-UN member Taiwan is not a party to the 
Convention.  
 
A key achievement of UNCLOS was agreement on spatial limits for national claims 
to maritime jurisdiction, which are largely defined as extending to a set distance from 
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baselines along the coast.
57
 The South China Sea claimants have proved to be enthusiastic in 
advancing such maritime claims. To a large degree these claims are broadly consistent with 
the terms of UNCLOS; comprising claims to 12 nm-breadth territorial seas, contiguous zones 
to 24 nm, EEZs to 200 nm and continental shelf rights. These claims, however, frequently 
only represent a general claim to jurisdiction to a specified distance measured from claimed 
baselines, rather than specifying the coordinates of a particular claim. There are, however, 
exceptions to this rule, both in terms of specifying the limits of unilateral maritime claims and 
with respect to their consistency with the terms of UNCLOS (see below). 
 
The semi-enclosed nature of the South China Sea means that it is surrounded by 
numerous bordering States and entities. This feature of the South China Sea means that the 
maritime entitlements of the claimants tend to converge and overlap with one another. If 
200nm claims from the mainland and main island coastlines are defined a substantial high 
seas pocket exists in the central part of the South China Sea. This ‘doughnut hole’ that is 
reduced in area but not eliminated once 200 nm limits are constructed from straight and 
archipelagic baselines as compared with claims from normal, low-water line baselines along 
the coast. However, this potential high seas pocket disappears entirely if extended claims to 
maritime jurisdiction (that is, to EEZ and continental shelf rights) are made from the disputed 
islands of the South China Sea. As noted many of the ‘islands’ of the South China Sea, for 
instance among the Spratly Islands, could be classified as either ‘rocks’ within the meaning 
of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, or low-tide elevations, or even sub-surface features and as 
such are incapable of generating claims to EEZ and continental shelf rights (and, indeed, any 
                                                 
57
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maritime claims in the case of features permanently below the low-water level). Indeed, there 
are indications that some of the South China Sea littoral States regard all of the Spratly 
Islands as no more than ‘rocks’, meaning that a high seas doughnut hole would exist in the 
South China Sea (see below). Other Claimants appear take a different view. It can be 
observed that even if only a few of the larger features among the disputed islands are capable 
of generating extended maritime claims, this potential South China Sea high seas pocket 




E. Existing agreements 
 
Despite its well-earned reputation as an arena for disputes and conflict, agreements on 
maritime boundary delimitation are not entirely absent from the South China Sea. Indeed, 
though progress has tended to have been incremental and partial in character, several 
boundary treaties have been concluded, including some in recent times. Examples include the 
Thailand and Malaysia territorial sea delimitation of 1979
59
 and partial continental shelf 
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delimitation of the same date,
60
 the Thailand-Viet Nam EEZ agreement of 1997,
61
 China and 
Viet Nam’s 2000 agreement on maritime boundary delimitation through the Gulf of 
Tonkin/Beibu Gulf,
62
 the Indonesia-Viet Nam continental shelf boundary of 2003
63
 and 
Indonesia and Singapore’s territorial sea boundary agreements of 1973 and 2009.
64
 Brunei 
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and Malaysia also appear to have clarified their maritime boundary issues through a 16 




The South China Sea also features multiple provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature in lieu or in addition to maritime boundary agreements. Such joint development 
mechanisms have been established between Malaysia and Thailand concerning seabed energy 
resources (agreed in principle in 1979,
66
 implemented from 1990), between Malaysia and 
Viet Nam, also related to seabed hydrocarbons exploration and development in 1992,
67
 and 




 The territorial sea boundaries between Brunei and Malaysia were defined in 1958 out to the 100 fathom 
isobath through two British Orders in Council. See Charney and Alexander, supra note 59, at 915-928. Brunei’s 
submission of preliminary information to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
further states that maritime boundaries between Brunei and Malaysia have been delimited by virtue of the 1958 
Orders in Council and ‘an Exchange of Letters dated 16 March 2009’ which served to delimit territorial sea, 
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Submission concerning the Outer Limits of its Continental Shelf, 12 May 2009, online: United Nations 
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 Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam for the Exploration 
and Exploitation of Petroleum in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf Involving the Two Countries was 




between China and Viet Nam in 2000 concerning joint fishing activities as part of their 
above-mentioned maritime boundary treaty.
68
 Cambodia and Thailand also agreed in 
principle to pursue an accord on maritime joint development for part of their overlapping 
claims area in 2001, although little progress has subsequently been achieved.
69
 These joint 
arrangements will be considered in more detail elsewhere in this volume but reference to 
them is included here as part of the overall jurisdictional scenario in the South China Sea. It is 
notable, however, that both the maritime boundary agreements and joint arrangements that 
have been concluded have been exclusively on a bilateral basis and largely towards the 
periphery of the South China Sea. 
 
F. Historic claims 
 
While it is the case that most, if not all, of the claims to sovereignty over disputed territory, 
that is, islands, in the South China Sea owe something to history, there also exist claims to 
maritime space that are, apparently at least, based on historical factors. In particular 
Cambodia and Viet Nam have, since 1982, claimed an oblong area of ‘joint historic waters’ 
projecting from their coasts (but within their claimed straight baselines, in the Gulf of 
Thailand)
70
 – a claim that has excited international protests.
71
 The Philippines has also long 
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claimed rights within its ‘Treaty Limits’ – the ‘box’ formed by several nineteenth and early 
twentieth century era treaties.
72
 In particular, the Philippines claims territorial sea rights 
within the Treaty Limits box, and thus out to 285nm at its furthest extent from the Philippines 
baselines.
73
 This claim and the Treaty Limits assertion generally, appear to be manifestly at 
variance to the terms of UNCLOS. 
 
The Philippines has also defined an irregular pentagonal box in the South China Sea, 
terming the islands within this box, the ‘Kalayaan Island Group’ (KIG). However, the KIG 
box does not appear to represent a claim to historic waters but instead provides an indication 
of a claim to sovereignty to all the territories (that is, islands) within this area. This 
interpretation is supported by the above-mentioned 2009 baselines revision leaves the South 
China Sea islands claimed by the Philippines outside the Philippine’s archipelagic baselines, 
instead dealing with them under the ‘regime of islands’, and in a manner consistent with 
UNCLOS. 
 
China’s (in)famous dashed line claim is of particular note here. This dashed line claim 
(if it can be termed as such), remains shrouded in uncertainty. An 11-dashed line first 
appeared on a map issued in 1947 by the Republic of China authorities but was subsequently 
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adopted by the PRC in 1949, albeit with two dashes removed from the early 1950s.
74
 These 
dashed lines are sometimes joined up by commentators to form a so-called ‘U-shaped line’ 
although it should be stressed that official Chinese sources consistently show a discontinuous 
line. What is also consistent is a lack of clarity as to what this dashed line actually signifies. It 
remains unclear whether the dashed line is a claim to sovereignty over the territory (that is, 
the disputed islands) within it, whether it is indicative of a unilateral claim to a maritime 
boundary or whether it represents a claim to the maritime spaces within the dashes, either as 
historic waters or another type of maritime zone. The significance of China’s inclusion of the 
nine-dashed line in its protest notes with respect to the extended continental shelf 
submissions of Viet Nam alone and Malaysia and Viet Nam jointly, similarly remains 
unclear. Nevertheless, several Chinese enforcement actions in the South China Sea in recent 
times strongly suggest that the nine-dashed line remains the basis for Chinese claims. These 
have included fisheries incidents in Indonesian claimed waters in the southwestern South 
China Sea,
75
 as well as incidents related to oil exploration activities on the part of both the 
Philippines and Viet Nam.
76
 Further, in mid-2012 the China National Offshore Oil 
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Corporation (CNOOC) designated a series of oil exploration blocks in close proximity to the 
Viet Namese coastline, yet just within the nine-dashed line which was also illustrated on the 
map showing the CNOOC blocks.
77
 These activities appear to be only justifiable on the basis 
of a claim to the limits of the nine-dashed line. 
 
G. Unilateral maritime claims 
 
While, as noted above, many of the South China Sea claimants, in common with many 
coastal States worldwide, simply make ambit claims to broad maritime jurisdictional zones, 
several of the claimants have been more specific regarding the spatial limits of at least some 
of their maritime claims. In the Gulf of Thailand, all of the littoral States defined unilateral 
continental shelf claims in the 1970s, which substantially overlap with one another.
78
 In the 
South China Sea ‘proper’, as previously mentioned, Malaysia issued a map in 1979 that 
shows the limits of Malaysia’s unilateral territorial sea and continental shelf claims.
79
 In 1988 
Brunei similarly defined a rectangular maritime claim extending into the South China Sea by 
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publishing a series of maps.
80
 In 2010 Indonesia also employed cartographic means to clarify 




H. Extended continental shelf submissions 
 
In 2009, in common with many coastal States around the world, Viet Nam alone
82
 and 
Malaysia and Viet Nam jointly
83
 made submissions to the UN Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (CLCS).
84
 These submissions are significant because they relate to 
areas seaward of the 200nm limit from these States mainland coasts. The implication of these 
submissions is that, as far as Malaysia and Viet Nam are concerned, the disputed islands of 
the South China Sea are, at best, no more than ‘rocks’ within the meaning of UNCLOS 
Article 121(3). This is fundamentally because, as noted above, if the disputed islands are in 
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fact islands capable of generating EEZ rights, then no area of extended continental shelf 




These submissions became a point of contention between the South China Sea 
claimants with both of the above-mentioned submissions prompting near-identical protest 
notes from China which stated in a diplomatic note directed to the Secretary General of the 
United Nations dated the day after Malaysia and Viet Nam’s joint submission was made, that 
China has ‘indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea’, and that, 
consequently, Malaysia and Viet Nam’s joint submission ‘seriously infringed China’s 
sovereignty’.
86
 These protest notes in turn led to counter assertions on the part of Malaysia 
and Viet Nam stating that their submissions ‘constitute legitimate undertakings’ in the 
implementation of its obligations as Parties to UNCLOS.
87
 Subsequently, communications 
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have also been directed to the United Nations Secretary General by Indonesia
88
 and the 
Philippines,
89
 both protesting China’s nine-dashed line, with the latter note leading to a robust 




It is worth noting here that the CLCS is a scientific and technical role rather than legal 
one in the sense of adjudicating between competing submissions. Indeed, the CLCS lacks the 
mandate to address areas subject to a sovereignty dispute or subject to overlapping maritime 
claims. Furthermore, the Commission’s recommendations are also specifically without 
prejudice to the delimitation of maritime boundaries with Article 76(10) of UNCLOS 
providing that ‘[t]he provisions of this article are without prejudice to the question of 




The extended continental shelf submissions process, and the reactions to the 
submissions made, is, however, of note in that these documents arguably assist in the 
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interpretation of existing maritime claims in the South China Sea. While attention was 
focussed on China’s inclusion of its nine-dashed line map with its protest notes, the language 
used in the Chinese protests is potentially instructive. In particular, China’s note verbale in 
response to the above-mentioned submissions of Malaysia and Viet Nam stated that China 
has ‘sovereignty’ over waters ‘adjacent’ to the disputed South China Sea islands and 
‘sovereign rights’ over ‘relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof’. This 
language is, arguably, consistent with claims to territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf 
rights made from the disputed islands, as opposed to a claim to historic waters or similar 
within the nine-dashed line, as has been speculated.
92
 Further, in its response to the protest 
made by the Philippines, China was explicit in stating that ‘China’s Nansha [Spratly] Islands 
is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, EEZ, and Continental Shelf.’
93
 Unfortunately it is not 
possible to be definitive on this point as China’s claim remains less than explicit. Moreover, 
China’s recent enforcement actions and activities such as the issuing of oil concession blocks 
in the South China Sea, as alluded to above, would seem to run counter to any suggestion that 
Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea are increasingly in keeping with UNCLOS. 
 




                                                 
92
 Robert Beckman, ‘South China Sea: Worsening Dispute or Growing Clarity in Claims?’, (Singapore, RSIS 
Commentary, 16 August 2010). 
93
 See Note from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the Secretary-General of the 




Sovereignty remains a critical element of the South China Sea disputes. Such disputes 
involve sovereignty over territory (that is, islands) and also sovereignty and sovereign rights 
over maritime spaces. Although traditional Westphalian conceptions of bounded territorial 
States have been subject to concerted criticism and challenge prompted, for instance, by 
deepening globalization, the territorial State has by no means withered away. On the one 
hand, globalisation has clearly led to increasingly unfettered flows of capital, ideas, 
information and to a large extent labour, across and within the boundaries of States, thereby 
arguably eroding the importance of international boundaries and undermining the 
significance and authority of territorial States themselves. This, in turn has led to the 
emergence of a developing literature challenging traditional assumptions concerning the role 
and relevance of bordered State sovereignties. There are, however, powerful countervailing 
forces favouring inertia in the international legal order and which serve to underpin territorial 
States. Further, while globalisation may be changing or diluting the significance of 
sovereignty and boundaries in some areas, in others they have been reinforced. For example 
security and environmental concerns have been deployed as a rationale for the reassertion of 
the role of territorial States and their international boundaries as barriers and filters against 
hostile ‘other’ influences and threats.  
 
For all the merits of the contemporary discourse and critique of territorial States, such 
entities remain as the key actors and fundamental building blocks of the international legal 
system. Indeed, it remains deeply unclear whether the international legal order, with the 
concept of the territorial State at its heart, is indeed under terminal threat, not least for want 
of a viable alternative system. Certainly sovereignty as a concept appears to be alive and 
well, indeed enthusiastically embraced, in East and Southeast Asia, including its associated 
maritime spaces. In this context it is important to note that the law of the sea gives States a 
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primary role (unsurprisingly since UNCLOS was the creation of States). Crucially, claims to 




Territorial States are, as the name suggests, dependent, at least in part, on the 
possession of a ‘defined territory’.
95
 The fundamental linkage between States and their 
constituent territories in international legal terms, coupled with the powerful influences of 
nationalism, patriotism and the demands of domestic and international politics, means that 
States tend to have great attachment to territory. Consequently, such entities tend to 
vigorously defend any apparent threat to their constituent territories as a threat to part of a 
State’s territory, however small, can be construed, especially to a domestic audience 
politically, as an assault on the territorial integrity of a given State and thus a threat to its 
legitimacy. This holds true no matter how small or apparently intrinsically worthless, for 
instance tiny, remote and uninhabited islets, such fragments of territory may appear from a 
detached, external perspective. 
 
                                                 
94
 This conclusion is implicit from the terms and language of the Convention and in particular its emphasis on 
the role of States. For example, in the preamble to UNCLOS reference is made to the desirability of establishing 
‘a legal order for the seas and oceans’ through the Convention ‘with due regard to the sovereignty of all States’. 
Further, among the few definitions of terms provided in Article 1 of UNCLOS, ‘States Parties’ is defined as 
‘States which have consented to be bound by this Convention and for which this Convention is in force.’ 
Moreover, regarding claims to maritime zones of jurisdiction, States are given an exclusive role. For example, 
Article 2 of UNCLOS dealing with the territorial sea provides that ‘[t]he sovereignty of a coastal State 
extends…’. Similar language prevails in respect of the other types of maritime zones covered by UNCLOS. 
95
  Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, provides that States should 
possess a ‘defined territory’, a permanent population, a government and the capacity to enter into international 
relations with other States. See the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States opened for 
signature 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934). 
49 
 
Disputed sovereignty, especially over land territory (disputed islands) remains a root 
cause, or at least explanation, for the South China Sea islands disputes, especially when 
coupled with the influences of historical competition and animosity. Compromising on 
sovereignty is especially challenging for territorial States, seemingly regardless of the remote, 
uninhabited and apparently desolate nature of the territory (islands) in question. It can be 
observed that this is especially the case where the legitimacy of the governments of the States 
involved is closely tied to nationalism and patriotism which, in turn, provides a strong 
imperative for the protection of perceived infringements of national sovereignty. 
 
It is noticeable, however, that many sovereignty disputes over such far-flung islands, 
including those of the South China Sea, have only manifested themselves in the post-World 
War II period, as extended claims to maritime jurisdiction became more prevalent. This has 
tended to add maritime jurisdictional and thus marine resource access issues as significantly 
complicating factors in sovereignty disputes. However, although sovereignty disputes are 
difficult to overcome, it is nonetheless possible to do so, for instance through the delimitation 
of international boundaries or through innovative joint arrangements of a provisional and 
practical nature that are, moreover, ‘sovereignty neutral’ and therefore do not imperil existing 
sovereignty claims. 
 
B. South China Sea oil dreams …or illusions? 
 
A long-standing assumption with respect to the broad areas of overlapping maritime claims in 
the South China Sea is that they are host to substantial reserves of seabed energy resources. 
Indeed, the words ‘potentially oil rich’ are often seen in close proximity to ‘South China Sea’ 
or ‘Spratly Islands’. Many such estimates are speculative, poorly supported and are thus 
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frequently highly misleading. Nonetheless, persistent perceptions that the South China Sea 
represents a major potential source of seabed energy resources and even a ‘second Persian 
Gulf’
96
 is often suggested as a key driver in the South China Sea disputes. Recent incidents 
involving oil and gas surveying and exploration activities tend to reinforce the view that 
access to valuable oil and gas resources underlying contested waters is an important 
contributing factor to the South China Sea disputes. 
 
Certainly the potential presence of substantial and, critically, close-to-hand reserves 
of, particularly, oil, would be extremely attractive to the South China Sea claimants in the 
face of their generally increasing energy security concerns. States in Northeast Asia such as 
South Korea and Japan have long been highly energy import dependent – Japan for instance 
importing 90% of its oil requirements by sea. China became a net oil importer in 1993 and is 
predicted to be importing 60% or more of its energy needs by 2020. In Southeast Asia, 
domestic production is generally plateauing or declining. This means that currently or 
recently exporting States such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam already are, or are highly 
likely to become, oil importers in the near future. This trend is compounded by predictions 
that oil demand for these States is likely to continue to rise. Indeed, International Energy 
Agency (IEA) figures suggest that growth in demand in Southeast Asia and China coupled 
with maturing production there will mean that net oil imports are likely to quadruple by 2030. 
In consequence imports would meet 74% of Southeast Asia’s oil demands, compared with 
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 This, in turn, tends to underscore the importance of sea lanes security (see 
below). 
 
These present and increasing energy security considerations go a long way to 
explaining not only the expansive maritime claims of the claimants, as well as the general 
intransigence of these claimants with regard to their maritime claims – to compromise on 
maritime claims may be perceived as running the risk of ‘missing out’ on a particular 
claimant’s perceived rightful share of the potential (though potentially illusory) oil bonanza. 
Suggestions that the Spratlys are host to enormous reserves of oil and gas should be viewed 
with caution, however. While parts of the South China Sea are prospective and have long 
attracted interest from the oil industry as well as the governments of coastal States, in light of 
the longstanding disputes in these regions, the actual presence and size of the seabed energy 
resources present within these contested areas have proved impossible to verify. Many 
estimates as to the oil and gas resource potential of the South China Sea tend to be highly 
speculative in character, precisely because of the lack of ground-truthing to information 
derived from exploration activities. 
 
South China Sea oil and gas resource estimates also tend to vary wildly. While this is 
partially attributable to their essentially speculative nature, a key reason for the broad 
disparities that exist between different estimates is a failure to distinguish between 
undiscovered oil and gas resources and recoverable reserves. The industry ‘rule of thumb’ for 
frontier provinces suggests that only 10% of estimated in situ resources can be recovered 
(though this figure can vary and is in any case a function of oil price and extraction 
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 For example, characteristically optimistic Chinese estimates for the oil and 
gas potential of the South China Sea tend to deal in resources rather than reserves. A further 
source of uncertainty relates to geographical definition. Some estimates quoted for the South 
China Sea in fact relate to Southeast Asia as a whole and thus includes resources located in 
undisputed waters or outside the South China Sea entirely.  
 
Moreover, many reports are less than rigorous in indentifying the type of resource 
under discussion and in particular whether conventional or unconventional oil and gas 
resources are subject to appraisal. Conventional crude oil is defined as oil that is less dense 
than water which generally flows from the ground under pressure, and remains liquid at 
surface temperature and pressure.
99
 Unconventional crude oil includes resources such as oil 
shale, tar sands and deepwater oil resources. With regard to the latter type of oil resources, 
significant technological advances are increasingly allowing exploration and development in 
deep (that is, according to some definitions, water depths in excess of 1,000 feet) and 
ultradeep (over 5,000 feet) waters.
100
 Such waters include parts of the South China Sea and 
exploration efforts are underway there as illustrated by China’s recent domestic construction 
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of semi-submersible, deepwater drilling rig capable of drilling in up to 3,000 meters of water 




In this context it is also worth noting that it has been suggested that the South China 
Sea is predominantly a gas-prone province. This is good news in that recovery rates from gas 
fields tend to be significantly higher than for oil fields (75% vs. 10%). That said, gas is a 
substantially less attractive resource than is oil in large part because of high dependence on 
oil as a key liquid fuel energy carrier, coupled with the significant limitations that exist in 
relation to the use of gas as a substitute for petroleum-derived fuels. In particular, although it 
is feasible to use gas in the transport sector, the global economy is to an extent ‘locked in’ to 
technologies that demand oil-derived fuels.
102
 Further, estimates for South China Sea gas 
reserves suffer from uncertainties of a similar magnitude as is the case for oil and for 
analogous reasons (principally because of lack of exploration opportunities as a consequence 
of overlapping maritime claims). A further important consideration is that many of the more 
optimistic assessments of the gas resource potential of the South China Sea fail to distinguish 
between conventional and unconventional gas resources. That is, many optimistic estimates 
include gas hydrates. While gas hydrates offer considerable potential as a future energy 
resource, at present their commercial development is well beyond the horizon. This is 
essentially because they rank as the most technically challenging, and therefore expensive, of 
unconventional gas resources. As a consequence of their position at the base of the hierarchy 
of gas resources, gas hydrates are only likely to be developed after less technically 
challenging and expensive gas resources are exploited. Given the enormous combined 
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volume of other unconventional gas resources, development of gas hydrates is presently 
beyond any foreseeable timescale. Consequently, the inclusion of gas hydrates in gas 
resource estimates for the South China Sea significantly and unrealistically inflates such 





The potential oil and gas resources of the South China Sea should also be placed in a 
regional and global context. The States of East and Southeast Asia face immediate and 
increasingly pressing energy security worries, especially as demand is anticipated to continue 
trending sharply upwards. However, even if the South China Sea disputes were to be resolved 
tomorrow (a tall order indeed), and exploration activities could begin in earnest, South China 
Sea energy resources, should they in fact exist, would provide no instant solution. This is 
because it is usual for approximately 10 years to elapse between the discovery of a field and 
‘first oil’ being delivered. Production from such a field would then need to build up over time 
such that the South China Sea resources would be unlikely to peak for a decade and a half 
following resolution (or shelving) of the territorial and maritime disputes in question. In any 
case, it also appears unlikely that South China Sea reserves are likely to significantly address 
existing and predicted energy demands, even taking into account the more optimistic resource 
estimates mentioned above. This suggests that the oil and gas resources of the South China 
Sea do not represent some kind of silver bullet for regional energy security concerns. 
 
C. Critical sea lanes 
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The South China Sea is host to a series of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) of regional 
and global significance. These SLOCs connect constricting ‘chokepoints’ that provide entry 
to and egress from the South China Sea. Of particular note in the southern part of the South 
China Sea are the Straits of Malacca and Singapore at the southwestern entrance to the South 
China Sea and the Karimata Strait providing access to the Java Sea and Indonesia’s 
archipelagic waters and thus the Straits of Sunda. In the northern South China Sea the Taiwan 
Strait between Taiwan and mainland China and the Bashi and Balintang Channels located 
between Taiwan and the Philippines main island of Luzon are significant. The South China 
Sea can also be accessed to the east via the Mindoro Strait and Cape Verde Passage 
(connecting to the Sulu Sea within the archipelagic waters of the Philippines). Moreover the 
South China Sea can be entered via the Straits of Lombok and Makassar and then the Balabac 
Strait between the Philippines archipelago and Borneo.
104
 This route is particularly important 
because it is a favoured route for very large crude carriers (VLCCs) when fully laden and is 
also significant for LNG exports from Australia to China. 
 
The SLOCs connecting these key chokepoints do not represent a single sea lane but 
rather a network of routes used for navigation. The precise route used by a particular ship is 
commonly influenced by its point of departure and intended destination, allied to weather 
considerations influenced by the time of year the voyage take place.
105
 What is worth noting, 
however, is that despite the fact that the disputed islands of the South China Sea are often 
referred to as being located on or straddling these SLOCs, in fact the island groups in 
question have long been regarded primarily as hazards to navigation – as shown by 
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terminology such as ‘Dangerous Ground’ as mentioned above. Consequently, much maritime 
traffic, for instance travelling between the Malacca and Singapore Straits and ports in East 
and Northeast Asia, tends to sail well to the west of the disputed Spratly Islands. Similarly, 




Secure SLOCs and freedom of navigation are essential to the smooth functioning of 
the global economy as maritime transport continues to provide the ‘backbone’ of 
international trade with in excess of 80% of global trade by volume being transported by 
sea.
107
 If anything this dependence on sea borne trade is accentuated for the generally 
resource-poor but export-oriented States of East and Southeast Asia and in this context the 
SLOCs that traverse the South China Sea are unquestionably crucial. As noted above, there is 
also a strong, and increasing, energy security dimension to sea lane security in the region. As 
already mentioned, oil and gas import dependence appears set to rise sharply in the future and 
the vast majority of these resources will be carried by sea. The IEA’s prediction, mentioned 
above, of quadrupling net oil imports by 2030 implies substantially increased tanker traffic in 
the future, thus emphasizing the significance of the SLOCs. A further consideration is that 
these waterways are not solely used for commercial traffic. The South China Sea and its 
SLOCs represents the shortest route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and is therefore 
used as a transit route by, for example, naval vessels attached to the United States Pacific 
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Command. SLOC security therefore remains a crucial and shared concern for all regional and 
indeed extra-regional States and is only likely to become more vital in the future. 
 
D. The real prize? Sustainable marine living resources and the environment 
 
The semi-enclosed, tropical environment of the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand hosts 
marine environments of extraordinary richness in biodiversity terms. These environments 
support fisheries of significance in global, and certainly regional, terms. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that the South China Sea alone accounts for as much as one tenth of global fish 
catches.
108
 Other sources have suggested that South China Sea fisheries provide catches of 
the order of five million tonnes per annum.
109
 These marine living resources are fundamental 
to the food security of coastal populations numbered in the hundreds of millions. Access to 
the waters of the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand in order to exploit these abundant 
living resources therefore represents an enduring maritime concern of the littoral States. It 
follows that the preservation and protection of the marine environment supporting living 
resources that are so crucial from a food security perspective should be top policy priority for 
the governments concerned. This is especially the case in reference to the vulnerable coral 
reef ecosystems of the disputed South China Sea islands, which provide important nursery 
and breeding grounds that are crucial to sustaining the fishery as a whole. In fact, however, 
the marine environment, biological diversity and living resources in question are under 
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 It remains decidedly unclear whether this factor is accorded the priority it 
deserves in practice, at least partially because of rival claims to sovereignty and also arguably 
misleading perceptions and priorities attached to hydrocarbons resource exploration and 
development.  
 
E. The evolving military and strategic context 
 
As is well known, all of the claimants to the Spratly Islands save for Brunei have backed up 
their claims to sovereignty with island occupations. While the terms of the 2002 Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) tended to forestall further island 
occupations, existing facilities have been maintained and in some cases substantially 
improved. In this context reports in mid-2011 that Chinese vessels had been observed 
‘unloading construction materials’ on a previously unoccupied feature, Amy Douglas reef 
raised significant concerns.
111
 Should China or any other claimant go ahead and construct a 
new facility and occupy a previously unoccupied feature, this would represent a clear breach 
of the DoC which calls on parties to ‘exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that 
would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, 
refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, 
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 While the military worth of these garrisons, save perhaps as listening 
posts, is questionable,
113
 fresh occupations of features could have a destabilising impact, 
would be likely to have a negative influence on the fragile environment of the disputed 
islands and should be set in the overall strategic context of the South China Sea.  
 
An important allied consideration in the overall geopolitics, and geopolitical 
competition, affecting the South China Sea disputes is the evolving military and strategic 
balance in the South China Sea. It is abundantly clear that the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) of China is undergoing a rapid process of modernisation efforts, backed by the largest 
defence budget in Asia – second only to the United States globally. While it is the case that 
other South China Sea claimants are also actively pursuing force modernisation initiatives, 
the pace and scope of the transformation of the PLA-Navy significantly outstrips their 
combined efforts. This shift in the regional balance of power and, particularly, the growing 
asymmetry in military terms between China on the one hand and the other South China Sea 
claimants on the other, affect the strategic and geopolitical context of the South China Sea 
disputes.
114
 Arguably, if this trend is maintained, as seems likely, China may have greater 
scope to uphold what it perceives to be its legitimate territorial and maritime claims, 
including through increasingly assertive and even coercive means. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that the South China Sea disputes, and thus the need to effectively protect and 
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reinforce sovereignty and jurisdictional claims, are themselves significant drivers for regional 
naval modernisation efforts.
115
 Even if this proves not to be the case, the fact remains that all 
of the South China Sea claimants are engaged in efforts to enhance their militaries, often with 
territorial and maritime disputes invoked as the justification for arms purchases. These 
developments, coupled with the failure of the parties to the DoC to implement the conflict 
management and avoidance mechanisms envisaged within that document, mean that the 
South China Sea is an increasingly armed environment. This, in turn, raises the stakes and the 
risks of confrontational incidents. It should also be recalled that the waters of the South China 
Sea are not solely the preserve or of interest to the littoral States and Taiwan. A number of 
extra-regional States, notably the United States, but also India, Japan and Korea have 
legitimate concerns in the South China Sea and the interest and presence of these States in the 
South China Sea appears likely to grow in the future, potentially adding complexity to the 




IV. Concluding Thoughts 
 
The South China Sea is complex in terms of its coastal geography. The semi-enclosed nature 
of the South China Sea, coupled with the multiple States bordering it mean that maritime 
entitlements converge and overlap. Further, the eastern and southern margins of the South 
China Sea are formed by islands and archipelagos and the South China Sea itself is host to a 
profusion of insular features of one type or another, many of which are subject to competing 
claims to sovereignty. These territorial disputes, coupled with uncertainties over what type of 
insular feature is under discussion and therefore what capacity a particular Spratly ‘Island’ 
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may have to generate claims to maritime jurisdiction or influence a maritime boundary 
delimitation line, considerably complicates the jurisdictional picture in the South China Sea. 
Add excessive claims to baselines and expansive and historically-inspired unilateral maritime 
claims and the level of complexity increases considerably, leading to substantial, though not 
entirely certain, areas of overlapping maritime claims and, indeed, overlaps of overlaps where 
the same maritime space is subject to the claims of multiple States. That said, it is worth 
observing that some progress, especially peripherally, has been made. A number of maritime 
boundary agreements and interim joint arrangements of a practical nature have been reached. 
There may also be some hints of increased clarity in existing and heretofore worryingly 
opaque jurisdictional claims. Overall though the geographical and maritime jurisdictional 
picture in the South China Sea is one of continued and daunting complexity and uncertainty. 
 
With respect to the geopolitical drivers of the South China Sea disputes, sovereignty 
continues to have a corrosive influence that is extremely difficult to overcome. States are, by 
their nature, territorial and there is ample evidence of this type of behaviour among the South 
China Sea littoral States and Taiwan. The South China Sea territorial disputes over islands 
cannot, however, be divorced from disputes over their associated maritime spaces and the 
valuable marine resources within these areas. Here a reordering of priorities is surely 
advisable. The waterways of the South China Sea certainly remain critical for all of the 
parties involved, especially from the point of view of trade and energy flows and this is likely 
to remain a shared concern. However, while there continues to be a strong perception that the 
South China Sea is host to substantial seabed energy resources, it is suggested that even 
should substantial oil and gas reserves exist, they are unlikely to solve escalating regional 
energy security concerns. Arguably of more urgent importance is ensuring the protection of 
the South China Sea’s marine environment with a view to ensuring the sustainability of South 
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China Sea’s fish stocks upon which millions depend for their primary protein needs. The 
geopolitical outlook for the South China Sea, in particular based on recent confrontational 
trends and set against a backdrop of increasing militarization of the area, is one that 
emphasises competition over cooperation. This, however, only reemphasises the pressing 
need for efforts to overcome the jurisdictional and geopolitical impasse. Maritime joint 
development zones and provisional arrangements of a practical nature provide an important 
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